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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No. 8378

R. W. STEWART,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent adopts the statement of the case
set forth in the appellant's brief and will state additional
facts only as those facts have particular bearing on respondent's argument.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CONTINENTAL IN
THE SUM OF $7,095'.81 AND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT THEREOF ARE SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND APPELLANT HAS
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO NOW OBJECT TO THE AMOUNT
OF THE JUDGMENT BY HIS PLEADINGS AND CONDUCT
IN 'THE TRIAL COURT.

POINT II.
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT AGREED TO PAY
THE OBLIGATION OWED BY CHENEY TO CONTINENTAL
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

POINT III.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL •COURT IS NOT ·CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
CONTRACTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CONTINENTAL IN
THE SUM OF $7,095'.81 AND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT THEREOF ARE SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND APPELLANT HAS
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO NOW OBJE·CT TO THE AMOUNT
OF THE JUDGMENT BY HIS PLEADINGS AND CONDUCT
IN 'THE TRIAL COURT.

The Trial Court concluded that Stewart was obligated to pay to Continental Bank the sum of $6,694.16,
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which sum included charges assessed against the Cheneys
as a direct and foreseeable result of Stewart's breach.
While there is no testimony in the transcript concerning
the figure, $6,694.16, the record does make specific reference to judgments which were entered against 1Ir. Cheney
as a result of the failure of Mr. Stewart to pay the obligation to Continental Bank. Mr. Cheney testified that
the Continental Bank had obtained judgments against
him, and pursuant to them he was "summoned" into
court (R. 15, 16). These judgments are detailed in the
affidavit of appellant's counsel (R. 116), together with
the dates on which they were entered. The total amount
of the judgments, as detailed in the affidavit, is $5,990.96,
which figure includes only principal and interest (R.
116). The notes all provided for attorney's fees and
costs were assessed in each judgment. These items represent the difference between $5,990.96 and $6,694.16.
The appellant, Stewart, in paragraph 3 of his answer
to plaintiff's complaint (R. 2), admitted that on the day
the complaint was filed A. W. Cheney and Effie S.
Cheney were indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of
$6,694.16. The answer merely denied that the defendant,
Stewart, had agreed to pay plaintiff, Continental Bank,
and further that the defendant, Stewart, was indebted to
plaintiff, Continental Bank, in the amount of $6,694.16.
The issue, therefore, that was tried was as to the promise
of Stewart to assume the obligation Cheney had with the
Continental Bank, not the issue whether the figure $6,694.16 was the amount Cheney was obligated to pay.
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A pretrial conference was held prior to the trial of
this action and it was orally agreed at that tin1e that the
amount $6,694.16 was not in dispute. This is further supported by the opening state1nent of counsel for appellant
who remarked, "Our only statement, Your Honor, is that
the defendant Stewart did not agree to pay the obligation
owing Continental Bank & Trust" (R. 3). This was the
entire context of the opening statement of counsel for
Stewart and it is noteworthy that no contention was made
at this point that the amount of the obligation was in
dispute.
Counsel for Continental Bank, believing that the
amount involved was not in issue, merely referred to the
figure as follows: "The amount, Your Honor, of the indebtedness between Cheney and Stewart is admitted in
the answer to be $6,694.16, and, calling Your Honor's
attention to that fact, the plaintiff will rest" (R. 20).
It is probable that counsel meant to indicate that the
indebtedness between Continental Bank and Cheney was
admitted in the answer to be $6,694.16. If that was the
intention of counsel, such was true, and no contention
was made by counsel for appellant at any stage in the
preceedings until this appeal that such was not the case.
The Court found as follows (R. 110) :
"7. As a consequence of the failure of defendant, R. W. Stewart, to pay plaintiff, The Continental Bank & Trust Company, the amount due
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on November 30, 1953, judgments were entered
against A. W. Cheney and Effie S. Cheney in
favor of plaintiff, The Continental Bank & Trust
Company, in the total amount of $6,694.16."
In defendant's :Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 113), referring to
this paragraph 7, appellant requested in paragraph 2
that the Court amend the findings by striking the following: "As a consequence of failure of defendant, R. W.
Stewart, to pay plaintiff, The Continental Bank & Trust
Company, the amount due on November 30, 1953." No
motion was made to amend the amount which was found
to be owing on that date.
This gives rise to a further objection to appellant's
citing the finding as error on appeal; that is, the failure of appellant to question the finding as to the amount
due in the Trial Court. Counsel for Stewart, by affidavit
(R. 116), attempted to show that newly discovered evidence justified a new trial (R. 118). This "newly discovered evidence" was the discovery on the court files of
four judgments against Cheney and his wife and in favor
of Continental Bank in the sum of $5,990.96, plus attorney's fees and costs. The objection \Vas made because of
the apparent discrepancy between $5,990.96 and $6,280.00,
the latter figure representing the sum which Cheney
testified Stewart had assumed and agreed to pay Continental Bank (R. 13). This discrepancy was readily explained on motion for new trial by counsel's citing the
F.H.A. regulationR which provide for a rebate of un-
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earned interest, according to a certain schedule, if a loan
is repaid or a judgment taken on the loan before the
period of time expires over which the loan is to run.
Thus, although Cheney owed the Bank $6,280.00 on November 30, 1953, when judgment was taken against him
on the notes in January of 1954, a rebate of interest resulted in a reduction in the amount of principal and interest owed to $5,990.96. But no contention was made by
appellant on this motion or at any stage in the Trial
Court that the total amount of the judgment, $6,694.16,
was erroneously entered by the Court.
As stated at 3 Am. Jur. 131, Appeal and Error, Sec.
399,
"Questions with respect to the amount allowed or recovered in the Trial Court cannot ordinarily be raised for the first time on appeal or review."
Likewise, 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 312, stated:
"Questions relating to the amount of the recovery or the extent of the relief granted will
generally not be considered in the Appellate Court
unless they have first been raised in the court
below by proper objection or request."
The reasoning for the rule is clearly stated by this court
in the case of Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2nd 266, 272
P. 2d 185, 186, as follows:
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"The duty is incumbent upon counsel to give
the Trial Court the opportunity to correct the
error before asking the Appellate Court to reverse
a verdict and judgment thereon."

It is submitted that the appellant has waived any objection to the amount sought to be recovered and entered
in the judgment as a result of his failure to raise the
question in the Trial Court. We do not believe Rule 52
(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein it is stated,
"When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the
court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised
whether or not the party raising the question has made
in the District Court an objection to such findings or
has made either a motion to amend them or motion for
judgment or a motion for a new trial," is applicable to
this situation for the reason that here the defendant did
raise objections in the Trial Court to certain findings of
fact, and the objections were duly considered by that
Court. Yet, in the objections raised, no contention was
made that the finding should have reflected the figure
$6,280.00 rather than $6,694.16.

POINT II.
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT AGREED TO PAY
THE OBLIGATION OWED BY CHENEY TO CONTINENTAL
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Appellant contends that the finding that appellant
agreed to pay the obligation owed by Cheney to Continental is not supported by substantial evidence and that
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such a state of facts is inherently improbable. The argument of appellant indicates that he wishes this Court to
believe that Stewart would not, as an intelligent man,
experienced in real estate transactions, have assumed to
pay obligations which were not liens or mortgages on the
real property he was buying.
First, let it be pointed out that perhaps the most
trustworthy witness and most favorable witness for the
respondent bank at the trial was not a person called to the
stand, but the figure which Stewart concedes was the
figure he agreed to pay "to banks"; that is, the figure,
$17,647.80. This figure is reduced to writing in the
Earnest Money Agreement signed by Cheney and. Stewart
(Exhibit 1-P). If Stewart intended to assu1ne all the
obligations which were liens or mortgages on the land,
as he now asserts, then he would only have had to assume·
on November 30, 1953 the sum of $15,506.94, since this
figure represents the total of the following obligations:
(1) the Barnes Bank first mortgage for $4,970.50, with
interest thereon from November 16, 1952 at 6% (R. 93),
or approximately $309.67; (2) the Barnes Bank second
mortgage in the amount of $6,000.00, with interest thereon at 6% from August 13,1953 (R. 94) in the approximate
amount of $106.77; (3) the mortgage on the cows and
the land which Barnes Bank sold to Valley State Bank
with a balance of $4,120.00, including interest (R. 94).
The total of these figures is $2,140.86 less than Stewart
obligated himself to pay. Mr. Gailey of Barnes Bank,
a witness for Stewart, testified on direct examination
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that Stewart had called on him and discussed these obligations prior to the date of the Earnest Money Agreement (R. 95). It is incredible that Stewart, knowing of
these amounts, would have agreed to pay $2140.86 over
and above the mortgages if his intention was to assume
only secured indebtedness. But if Stewart intended to
pay Continental Bank and Barnes Bank, the calculation
would be as follows: First mortgage and second mortgage of Barnes Bank set forth above totaling $11,386.94,
plus $6,280.00, the figure representing the Continental
indebtedness, or a total of $17,666.94. Note that there
is a discrepancy between this total and the sum Stewart
agreed to assume of only $19.14, which discrepancy could
easily result on the interest calculation. Certainly this
evidence, contributed by the figures themselves, fully sustains the finding of the Trial Court that Stewart assumed
the obligation to pay Continental Bank. The figures on
the slips of paper which Bell, the real estate agent, totaled
in the presence of both Cheney and Stewart (R. 27) must
have included the Continental Bank and Barnes Bank
obligations, otherwise the figure $17,647.80 could not have
been arrived at on any reasonable basis. It should be
emphasized that Stewart insisted the obligation to Valley
State Bank in the amount of $2860.00 (R. 103), and secured by a mortgage on cows only, was not part of the
deal (R. 69). But if it was Stewart's intention to assume
all indebtedness of the seller, Cheney, to the Barnes Bank
and Valley State Bank, then the total amount which
he would have assumed to pay would be $18,366.94. No
combination of figures introduced through the various
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witnesses, including officers of both Valley State Bank
and Barnes Bank, totals anywhere near $17,647.80, except the total of the two notes to Barnes Bank and the
Promissory notes to Continental.
It is significant that the witness Bell, who closed the
sale of the property, was not positive that the figures
which he used in computing the $17,647.80 did not include
the Continental Bank obligation. On cross examination
Bell admitted that the Continental Bank indebtedness
could have been included in the tabulation of figures that
he made (R. 35).
Appellant asserts that the only testimony concerning
the Continental Bank having been the intended beneficiary of this agreement is oral. Yet the most reliable
evidence in arriving at the intention of the parties is the
written Earnest l\foney Agreement itself which refers
to the payment to banks as follows: "Arrangements to
pay banks in the amount set forth amounting to
$17,647.80."
The written evidence introduced at the trial by appellant which has been referred to as the "clarification
agreement" of December 3, 1955 (Exhibit 3-D) could not
have been entered into for the purpose of clarifying the
agreement of November 30th as appellant contends.
Note that the agreement of December 3rd does not clarify
which banks were meant in the original contract of November 30th. The insertion in the agreement of December
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3rd of the words "and assume all obligations secured by
liens or mortgages on the real property" indicates no
purpose to clarify when it is considered that the meeting
was called at l\Ir. Iverson's office for the apparent purpose of reducing to writing the agreement to substitute
the Texas property for the $6,000.00 cash payment originally included in the Earnest :Money Agreement. The insertion of the clause referring to liens and mortgages
seems incidental to the purpose of the meeting and the
contract when read as a whole.
The same must be said for the evidence introduced
through Mr. Greenwood, attorney for Cheney, concerning
a emnplaint filed in Davis County (Exhibit 2-D), wherein,
as an aside, it is stated, referring to the earnest money
agreement,
"Whereby defendant undertook to pay $23,647.80 for said property payable $17,647.80 to
banks holding various liens and mortgages upon
said premises."
Neither the "clarification" agreement of December 3rd
nor the complaint filed by Mr. Greenwood was primarily
concerned with the assumption by Stewart of obligations
owed by Cheney to banks.
Another observation concerning the "clarification"
agreement of December 3rd is worthy of mention. At
page 50 of the record, the witness Stewart was asked on
cross examination whether he had any further conversations with Cheney concerning the obligations at any time
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after December 3rd. Stewart replied that he did have a
subsequent conversation, probably about the 4th of December, at Cheney's place. Stewart stated that in substance the conversation was as follows:
"A.

I was interested in knowing what obligations
he had and how much he owed on these,
against the place, not only the real-

Q.

Tell us just what was said by you and what
was said by him.

A.

Well, I mentioned to Mr. Cheney that he owed
a great deal more on the place than he had
represented to me that he had. I said, 'You
not only owe Barnes Bank so much, the Valley
State Bank, but,' I said, 'in checking over, I
find you also have an F.H.A. against the
Continental on this thing, which makes a total
price for the place of approximately twentyeight or twenty-nine thousand,' I says, 'and
I only agreed to pay you approximately
twenty-three thousand for the place.' I think
that was the approximate figure."

The question raised by this testimony is why a conversation was had on December 4 concerning obligations owing
to various banks, one of which was obviously not a lien
or mortgage on the property, if the agreement of December 3rd, executed one day prior thereto, had resolved the
question as to which obligations were meant by those
owing to "banks." The defendant Stewart testified that
he had gone to the Continental Bank and checked the
amount of the obligation when the "second agreement"
was executed (R. 87).
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The entire testimony of Stewart is somewhat difficult of belief when certain inconsistencies are noted. For
instance, Stewart, at page 80 of the record, testified that
he knew of the obligation of Cheney to Continental Bank
prior to the execution of the earnest money agreement,
yet didn't know the nature of it. His entire effort at the
trial to disprove liability was on the basis that he intended to assume only obligations that were liens or mortgages on the land. The very nature of the obligation in
question in the case, admittedly, according to Stewart,
was not understood by him at the time the agreement was
signed.
It is further observed that Stewart, being a man experienced in real estate transactions, if his intention was
to pay only obligations that were liens and mortgages on
the property, conducted himself in a very unusual manner. He did not agree in writing to pay off "the obligations that were liens and mortgages on the property/'
but to pay a certain amount, yet this amount was not computed as a result of Stewart's investigation of items
that were liens and mortgages on the property, but rather,
was the result of a tabulation of slips of paper handed
to Bell and Stewart by Cheney (R. 60), containing a list
of certain bank obligations. Stewart also testified that
he had gone to the County Recorder's Office of Davis
County (R. 89), and satisfied himself as to the amount
of the liens on the property and discovered that the
amount of the Barnes Bank indebtedness did not square
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with Cheney's figures (R. 88), yet he obligated himself
to pay a certain amount of money when the obvious thing
would have been for him to obligate himself to pay those
obligations that were liens and mortgages and detail
the same. Stewart also testified that he relied on the
County Recorder's Office of Davis County for informati()n as to the amount owing by Cheney on various obligations. On cross examination Stewart stuck to this story
even though it was admitted by him that the County
Recorder's Office would not indicate the amount then
owing on the obligations, but rather, the amounts of the
original liens (R. 89).
If a good reason is needed for supporting the proposition that two supposedly intelligent men could have
entered into the contract intending that Continental Bank,
an unsecured creditor, be a beneficiary thereof, it is found
in this testimony of Cheney (R. 9):
"I told them that I also owed the Continental
Bank because they put up the money for remodeling of the home and the building of a new garage
and a lounging shed, and that I would like them
paid because the bank had been very white with
me, and 1\fr. Stewart told me, he said, 'We will
personally take care of that and see that that is
paid'."
Cheney further testified that Mr. Steffenson from the
Continental Bank had been to his home the day before
and requested him to sign another mortgage on his property. Cheney testified (R. 10) :
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"Vlell I took the idea it would interfere with
the sale of the property by signing another mortgage, so I told him to wait because we thought we
had a sale in the making and that party that was
making the sale would take care of the bank; and
:Jfr. Stewart told me that he would take care of the
bank.''
Obviously, the F.H.A. loans were used for the improvement of the real property, and even though not liens
thereon, it is reasonable to expect a seller of the property
to attempt to satisfy the cost of improving it out of the
proceeds. It is also obvious that Steffenson was pressing Cheney for payment of the Continental obligations,
or, in the alternative, security in the form of another
real estate mortgage.
The appellant's contention that accepting Cheney's
testimony results in a judgment that is harsh, unfair and
inequitable is apparently based on the testimony that Mr.
Stewart, subsequent to the execution of the agreement of
November 30, 1953, paid an obligation at Valley State
Bank, which was a lien on the land. It is interesting to
note that he has also satisfied an obligation to that bank
which was not a lien on the land (R. 79). If the result
in this case is harsh, it is so only because Stewart volunteered to pay an obligation which he was not legally
obligated to pay by the agreement of November 30, 1953.
POINT III.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
CONTRACTS.
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It is conceded that the Continental Bank stood in no
better shoes than did Cheney. But Cheney could have
sued on the obligation of November 3, 1953, which admittedly was never modified, and, by showing what was
shown in the Trial Court, including evidence that the
banks referred to were Barnes Banking Company and
Continental, he could have recovered $23,670.80, less any
amount Stewart had paid said banks, and less $6000.00
represented by the Texas property which had since been
conveyed to hirn. He could never have recovered the
amount Stewart voluntarily paid to Valley State Bank,
nor could Valley State Bank have enforced the contract
in its behalf on the evidence presented. Thus, it is entirely probable that the judgment of the Trial Court could
be sustained if plaintiff were Cheney instead of Continental. Appellant's argument that Continental cannot prevail as a matter of law is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Two frequent observations of this Court seem particularly applicable to the instant appeal. The first is to
the effect that this Court is required to take all the evidence and every reasonable inference therefrom in a light
most favorable to the prevailing party in the Trial Court.

Kimball Elevator Co., Inc. v. Elevator Supplies Co., Inc.,
2 Utah (2d) 289, 27~ P. 2d 583. The second is to the effect
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that the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses is in
a better position than this Court to properly evaluate
them and pass on their credibility. Green v. Equitable

Life Assurance Society of U.S., 3 Utah (2d) 375, 284 P.
(2d) 695. Three persons participated in the conferences
prior to the execution of the earnest money agreement.
Cheney and Stewart told conflicting stories in the court
below. Bell, the real estate agent was too uncertain to
fortify either version of the transaction. Applying the
propositions stated above to the situation here, the judgment of the Trial Court is wholly justified by the weight
of the evidence and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW,
H. G. CHRISTENSEN and ALLEN M. SWAN,

Attorneys for Respondent
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